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Optimal Compulsion when Behavioral Biases 





When behavioral biases have varying sizes, and the State seeks to correct behavior through 
compulsion, the question is how to design optimal compulsion. One argument is that the 
amount of compulsion should rise with the size of the bias to be “cured”. A contrary argument 
is that since compulsion affects actions, and recommended actions are independent from the 
bias, the amount of compulsion should not depend on the bias. This puzzle is solved for the 
case where individuals are affected by a bias that leads them to under-save, acknowledging 
that the planner predicts each individual’s optimal action with error. Since only low-bias 
individuals are able to correct the planner’s mistakes when mandated to save too little, but not 
in the opposite direction due to a costly spread, the optimal amount of compulsion rises with 
the predicted bias. As an application, the paper explores a behavioral rationale for a 
Maximum for Taxable Earnings (MTE). It finds that if (1) the State’s information is limited to 
current earnings; (2) earnings do not influence the earnings ratio for old age; and (3) the bias 
is smaller only for the highest earnings quintile, then a MTE near the 80
th percentile of the 
earnings distribution is optimal. 
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Many heavy smokers, drinkers and spenders regret their behavior later on, when there is no free 
turnaround to recover what has been lost. Since these biases affect different individuals to 
different degrees, and the “correct” behavior is difficult to predict, public policies aimed to 
correct such biased behaviors can do more harm than good, for many or even for most 
individuals. But laissez-faire may also do worse than a modest amount of simple compulsion. 
 
The question tackled in this paper is how should a benevolent planner vary the amount of 
compulsion, taking into account his own errors, both when estimating each person’s optimal 
action and when assessing the size of the bias for each individual. 
 
A natural rule of thumb is that compulsion should be targeted to those with large behavioral 
biases, and that others should be exempt (Gill et al 2005). Indeed, Saint-Paul (2009) asserts that 
since behavioral biases are essentially a matter of the poor, compulsion should be targeted to the 
poor alone. However, this rule-of-thumb is not straight-forward. A benevolent planner would 
try to reach the optimal action for the individual in the absence of bias. Thus, the optimal action 
would not depend on each individual’s level of bias, precisely because the bias is what needs to 
be set aside. If the planner can adjust the individual’s behavior by making the optimal action 
compulsory, it follows that the amount of compulsion should not depend on the level of bias.  
 
This paper proceeds in two steps. First, it identifies conditions under which the optimal amount 
of compulsion is independent from the level of bias. The critical condition turns out to be that 
the planner is able to predict accurately each individual’s optimal action. In that setting the 
planner’s other mistake, concerning the assessment of each individual’s bias, does not matter.  
 
Second, the paper identifies optimal policy in the realistic case where the planner errs in 
assessing each individual’s optimal action. These mistakes make compulsion less efficient, 
creating scope for voluntary action. Indeed, Beveridge argued that “the State in organizing 
security should (…) leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to 
provide more than that minimum for himself and his family” (Beveridge, 1942, p. 7).
1 In this 
paper free action (no compulsion, or laissez-faire) is valued instrumentally, as the means for 
avoiding the inefficiencies created by the planner’s mistakes. 
For incomplete information scenarios, the optimal level of compulsion does depend on the 
predicted bias for each individual. Let us illustrate with an example, where a planner seeks to 
increase saving for old age because a behavioral bias leads many to save less than optimal. On 
average, the planner knows that he might mistakenly force some individuals to oversave, while 
others might be required to save too little relative to their bias-free needs. When compulsion is 
set higher than what the individual deems optimal, the individual does not counteract over-
saving if the cost of consumer credit is prohibitive. In contrast, when the mandatory saving rate 
is set below what the biased individual would have chosen freely, the individual can respond in 
two ways: if her bias is small, she can be relied upon to repair most of the planner’s mistake by 
raising her voluntary savings. However, if her bias is large, she will not repair the mistake and 
will indulge in her biased behavior.  
                                                 
1 The literature on why a wider scope for free action is desirable includes Regan (1983) and Zamir (1998). On 
paternalism and the value of individual freedom, see also Burrows (1993) and Buchanan (1959). - 3 - 
 
 
Therefore, the planner’s cost of under-predicting the optimal mandatory saving rate is larger 
when the individual’s bias is larger. In contrast, the cost of mandating the individual to oversave 
is independent from the size of the bias that affects each individual. This asymmetry leads the 
optimizing planner to cut the compulsory contribution rate for individuals whose bias is 
predicted to be low. Thus, the optimal amount of compulsion should rise with the bias.  
This rationale fades as the planner predicts the optimal action more accurately. The precision of 
the predicted bias is important too. As this precision falls, the conditioning of compulsion on the 
predicted level of bias is reduced gradually under optimal policy, and is eventually eliminated. 
 
The last part of this paper applies these general results to a long-standing issue in pension 
economics. Imagine that higher earnings are correlated with a smaller bias regarding old-age 
savings, and therefore high earners are less affected by insufficient compulsory saving. The 
previous results suggest that it would be optimal to reduce the compulsory contribution rate on 
high earners. This might support a “behavioral rationale” for the well-known policy that sets a 
maximum on taxable earnings (MTE).  
 
Table 1 reports the MTE for a sample of 60 countries in 2008, expressed as a ratio of GDP per 
capita. The observed ratios are diverse: nearly a fifth of the countries set a MTE below their 
own GDP per capita; a fifth go to the opposite extreme and set no limit at all. The middle 60% 
exhibits a median MTE equal to 2.26 times GDP per capita. This ratio is 2.33 for the U.S.A. 
About 83% of the sample with a finite MTE reduces the marginal contribution rate by at least 
75% as the MTE is surpassed. 
 
The size of the MTE is at the crux of an old debate between the Beveridgian and the 
Bismarckian designs for contributory old-age pensions that are not redistributive. Beveridge’s 
(1942) prescription was a contributory system of flat old-age benefits financed with a flat 
amount of contributions per worker.
2 This implies a MTE equal to the minimum wage, at the 
lower end of the feasible range for MTEs. In contrast, Bismarck’s (1889) prescription was a 
single contribution rate applied to all earners, which implies an unbounded MTE. When the 
MTE is set at a mid-point, its size tells the degree of “Bismarckianess” of the pensions system.  
 
Demand for mid-point MTEs runs strong among modern policymakers. For example, the 2004 
Report of the UK Pension Commission posited that “there is a social interest in ensuring that 
people of modest or average means (e.g. those up to the 75th percentile of earnings) have made 
provision which they would consider adequate, but that above some level of income (say above 
the 90th percentile) a purely individualist approach is appropriate.” (Report, p. 129)
 3. 
 
How does this paper contribute to this debate? First, a disclaimer: there are at least three main 
benevolent rationales to adopt or change a MTE: fiscal, market-structure, and behavioral.
 4 
                                                 
2 Not to be confused with systems where a proportional tax on earnings finances a flat benefit for the old. Such a 
redistributive and non-contributory system was mistakenly labeled as “Beveridgean” by Cremer et al (2007). 
3 This Report is available at www.pensionscommission.org.uk  
4 Gill, Packard and Yermo (2005, p. 230-232) contribute two other benevolent rationales in support of a MTE. 
First, they posit that personal investments such as owner-occupied housing and prepayment of expensive consumer 
credit, provide higher returns than the purchase of pension rights even under full funding. Second, they argue that 
for low earners compulsion is  not costly, because high-return personal investments are denied to them anyway by 
non-divisibility thresholds. If less compulsion allowed some high earners to accumulate enough savings to 
overcome those thresholds, the opportunity cost of compulsion would be larger for high than for low earners. - 4 - 
 
 
Fiscal and market-structure rationales for a MTE are outlined in section 6.2. This paper’s 
contribution to this debate relates only to behavioral rationales for a MTE.  
 
There is empirical backing for the hypothesis that high earners have a lower bias on average. 
For example, Stango and Zinman use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances in the U.S.A. to 
measure “exponential growth bias” and find that its size is significantly lower for the highest 
earnings quintile (2009, Table IV). We have found no empirical evidence on the link between 
earnings in the first phase of life and net earnings in old age. 
 
This paper fails to support in general the behavioral argument for a finite MTE. A modern State 
observes each individual’s current taxable earnings, age, occupation, rural/urban status, 
education, marital status, wealth, gender and other socio-demographic attributes. Let us assume 
that anti-discrimination legislation does not preclude a State from conditioning the compulsory 
contribution rate on at least one of the attributes with impact, apart from earnings. For example, 
in Switzerland the mandatory contribution rate for old age-savings depends on age, and in many 
countries it also depends on occupational sector and on labor market status. Therefore, 
conditioning the amount of compulsion on current earnings alone is inefficient. Recently, 
Stango and Zinman (2009, Table IV) found that the size of “exponential growth bias” is 
strongly influenced by education, after controlling for the impact of the current earnings quintile 
and gender. Thus, the Beveridgian and the Bismarckian extremes, and also intermediate levels 
for the MTE, make suboptimal use of information.  
 
Next, the paper explores optimal policy for an informationally constrained State, who is limited 
to observe current earnings. If the current earnings quintile is the only predictor of both the bias 
and net earnings in old age for an individual, the paper finds that optimal policy still depends on 
the impact of earnings on the optimal age-earnings ratio for old age. For example, if a higher 
salary induces earlier retirement by enough, it reduces the overall earnings obtained in the 
second phase of life, and this increases desired savings for old age. If this link is important, it 
influences the optimal schedule that connects the contribution rate and current earnings. Indeed, 
a strong impact of this type may convert the optimal MTE into a Lower Earnings Limit. 
Therefore, an MTE may be suboptimal even for a State subject to this informational limitation. 
 
However, in the further subcase where earnings have a negligible influence on the desired age-
earnings ratio for old age, the inability to observe data other than current earnings brings the 
MTE approach close to optimality. For example, if the bias is flat for most earnings quintiles, 
except for the highest, where the bias falls, as in the data for the U.S.A., then informational 
limitations make an MTE optimal near the 80
th percentile of the earnings distribution.  
 
For the Beveridgean system to be optimal, the predicted bias needs to fall continuously as 
earnings rise above the minimum salary. For the Bismarckian system to be optimal, all workers 
need to be equally biased, including those in the highest earnings quintile. Both are rejected for 
U.S.A. data. 
 
Section 2 reviews briefly the literature on benevolent compulsion. Section 3 presents a simple 
model of excessive optimism, the behavioral bias used in this paper. Section 4 explores the case 
of a planner whose informational resources allow accurate prediction of the optimal action. 
Section 5 defines and simulates optimal policy for States with realistic amounts of informational 
resources, and obtains the main results. Section 6 discusses application to the optimal Maximum 





2. Brief review of the literature on benevolent compulsion in saving for old age 
Altruism leads people to vote for policies that alleviate poverty. However, then some of the 
young that have modest earnings may engage in under-saving to benefit from subsidies to the 
old-age poor. Compulsion has been justified as a policy that prevents this response (Hayek 1960 
p. 286, Musgrave 1968, Kotlikoff 1987). This argument is also referred to as the “savings moral 
hazard” or “rational prodigality” hypothesis. However, recent literature has shown that when a 
negative income tax is available, the State should never use compulsion, because compulsion 
deepens distortions to the labor choices of the young poor , who prefer to work less to avoid 
compulsory savings (Homburg, 2006). If compulsory savings drives consumption of the young 
poor that work too close to subsistence, voters would not be altruistic (Valdés-Prieto, 2000). 
Time-inconsistency is a more robust argument for compulsion. Several branches of time-
inconsistency theory are relevant for old-age saving. The “hyperbolic discounting”, “finite 
horizons” and “procrastination” branches stress that people have great concern for immediate 
consumption, but neglect distant consumption, and this leads them to under-save. The 
difference between these branches lies in the way they model preference for future 
consumption. Under “hyperbolic discounting”, the discount factor falls steeply at first and then 
flattens out. (Laibson 1997, Imrohoroglu et al 2003, Fehr et al 2008). In the “finite horizon” 
branch, the discount factor is constant for several periods up to some moving horizon, beyond 
which it drops abruptly to zero (Feldstein 1985, Docquier 2002, Caliendo and Aadland 2007). 
In “procrastination” models, hyperbolic discounting is supplemented by a second aspect of 
preferences: the individual is hopeful (naively) that her own degree of hyperbolic discounting 
will diminish in the future (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). 
 A fourth branch of time-inconsistency is “unrealistic optimism” (Weinstein1980, Scheier, 
Carver and Bridges 1994), also referred to as “overconfidence” (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 
Caliendo and Huang 2008) in the finance literature. In this case, individuals suffer from an 
optimistic bias when projecting their future budget sets, not their future preferences. This bias 
can take several forms. Expenses at old age, such as health costs, may be projected to be lower 
than unbiased estimates. The young may anticipate higher earnings when old than they should. 
Evidence in favor of unrealistic optimism has been offered by Quadrel et al (1993), Weinstein 
and Klein (1996), and Puri and Robinson (2007). In Germany the SAVE survey found a large 
bias in expected lifetime: women aged 35-75 underestimate their life by about five years, while 
men aged 35-70 do so by about four years (Steffen 2009, fig. 4.6). The model presented below 
belongs to this branch of time-inconsistency. 
 
Finally let us review the empirical backing for the hypothesis that high earners have a lower 
bias on average. This backing may be different for each specific model for the bias. Stango and 
Zinman (2009) use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to measure “exponential growth 
bias” and find its size is negatively correlated with current earnings. Bhandari and Deaves 
(2006) use survey evidence for 2,000 Canadian employees to measure another bias, defined as 
the difference between knowledge perception and actual knowledge, and find it is weakly 
positively correlated with current earnings (Table 3). Puri and Robinson (2007) define “extreme 
optimism” as belonging to the right-most 5% of individuals in the distribution of differences 
between self-reported life expectancy and that implied by statistical tables. They find that - 6 - 
 
 
“extreme” optimists have short planning horizons and save less than “moderate optimists”, who 
display prudent financial habits. They do not report the demographics of extreme optimists. 
 
3. A simple behavioral model for compulsory contributions 
We use a model in which individuals are affected by an overconfidence bias, which a 
benevolent planner tries to correct. In this model individuals may limit the effects of 
compulsion by reducing voluntary savings, and also by accruing expensive consumer debt. 
3.1 The labor market 
The life cycle is collapsed into two separate periods, the active phase and old age. Each period 
lasts 30 years with active age beginning at age 20, and old age at age 50. Define: 
ya = net earnings in the active phase. 
yp




 = net old-age earnings ratio, as expected by the individual in her active phase. To 
simplify, this paper assumes that individuals believe they have a fully accurate estimate of ψ 
e. 
 
The supply of hours of labor at each age is set institutionally, so it is inelastic to wages. The 
model focuses on the impact of a behavioral bias. Define: 
 
ψ  = unbiased net old-age earnings ratio when old. 
b ≡ ψ 
e−ψ  = size of the behavioral bias suffered by this particular individual.  
 
If ψ 
e> ψ , the individual suffers an overconfidence bias. Note that the bias b is defined as a 
proportion of net earnings in the active phase. Ageing is represented by  ψ 
e < 1 and ψ
 < 1. 
 
3.2 The contributory old-age pensions system 
 
The compulsory pensions system is described by two formulae: one for benefits and another for 
the contribution amount. The average contribution rate for any given individual is 
a a y y C / ) ( ≡ θ , where C(ya) is the contribution amount when reported earnings is ya. 
Other branches of social insurance, such as health insurance and unemployment insurance, 
usually create an extra tax on covered earnings because the marginal benefit from extra 
contributions is smaller than the marginal contribution, in expected present value. Define: 
 
 ta =  net tax rate on covered earnings levied by other branches social insurance. This tax is net 
from any marginal benefits supplied directly by those branches to the individual.   
 
Turn now to the pension benefit formula. Define: 
ρc = internal rate of return paid by the contributory pensions system to each generation of 
participants. This rate governs the link between individual benefits and contributions. - 7 - 
 
 
With two-period lives, the amount of the pension benefit is simply the contribution times the 
gross rate of return, or  () c a y ρ θ + ⋅ ⋅ 1 ) ( . It is further assumed that the compulsory pensions 
system is fully funded (see reasons in section 6.2). This implies: 
(1)     PF PF c r r = − ⋅ = ) 1 ( τ ρ  
where r is the pre-tax rate of return paid out in the capital market, and τPF is the tax rate levied 
on the capital income of the pension fund (interest, dividends and net capital gains)
5. The model 
is partial equilibrium because r is fixed, or applies to a small open economy. 
 
3.3 The individual’s budget constraint  
 
To obtain each period’s budget constraint, define: 
 
F = stock of voluntary financial savings at the end of the active phase. 
r = pre-tax rate of interest paid on voluntary (financial) savings (F >0).  
τS = tax rate levied on the return from voluntary saving. 
) 1 ( ) ( S r r τ − ⋅ ≡ +  = after-tax rate of interest paid to voluntary saving deposits (F >0).  




Positive administrative and marketing costs in financial intermediation, and a positive gross 
interest rate r, guarantee that s > 0. A positive spread creates a kink in the budget constraint that 
limits the range where perfect substitution between compulsory and voluntary saving applies. 
Because of the positive spread, a number of individuals choose not to use consumer credit to 
undo mandatory contributions. This kink in the budget constraint limits consumer credit, but 
does not limit saving, an asymmetry that turns out to be important for optimal compulsion. 
 
The period budget constraints perceived when young are: 
 
(2a)  F t y c a a a − − − ⋅ = ) 1 ( θ  
(2b)  )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( F nr F r y y c PF a a
e
p + ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = θ ψ  
 
where nr(F) = r(-)  if F ≥ 0  and  nr(F) = r(+)  if F < 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that  rPF 
= ) 1 ( ) ( S r r τ − ⋅ ≡ + . This applies, for example, under fully-funded pension finance and equal tax 
treatment for voluntary and compulsory saving for old age. 
3.4  Individual optimization in the active phase 
The individual maximizes lifetime utility, which is assumed to be additively separable across 
phases of life. The individual solves the following standard problem (P1) in the active phase: 
                                                 
5 The tax rate τPF should be interpreted as the sum of the personal income tax rate with the portion of the corporate 
tax rate that cannot be deducted from personal taxes (Feldstein and Liebman 2002). 
6 The authorities add interest income to the taxable base, but do not allow interest paid in loans to be deducted from 
the taxable income. In addition, fiscal incentives for voluntary saving for old age channeled through the financial 
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where  u’ > 0, u’’< 0.  
The choice of F* is standard, determined by preferences (discount factor β and intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution σ), by the spread s that governs the net return nr(F), and by the 
distribution of earnings in the life cycle perceived  by the individual, given by her own 
perceived net old-age earnings ratio ψ
e. Note that the planner’s unbiased estimate of 
productivity ratio when old, defined as ψ
p, does not influence voluntary saving F*. This 
discrepancy is the basis for benevolent policy.  
 
4. Optimal compulsion in extreme informational scenarios 
 
This and the next section show that the planner’s choice of optimal compulsion depends 
critically on the information he possesses about the individual’s preferences and opportunities. 
The planner’s optimal contribution rate is identified in three scenarios, which differ by the 
amount of information the planner has. In all scenarios, the planner is supposed to know ta, r 
and τS because they are common to all individuals, and to know θ because it is set by himself. 
 
4.1 Optimal compulsion for third-best information 
The scenario designated here as “third-best” is the one where the planner has the least 
information. The planner does not have information about each individual´s personal 
circumstances, parametrized in section 3 by ψ
e, s, β and σ.  
 
Imagine that the planner suspects that there is a correlation between personalized earnings ya 
and the individual’s degree of overconfidence b (as posited by Saint-Paul, 2009). However, 
assume also that personalized earnings ya are not observed by the authorities. For example, this 
occurs when employers do not break down contributions by worker, say because of the lack of a 
national identification number, or because of costly or inefficient administration. Thus, in a 
third-best scenario the planner is ignorant of each individual’s degree of overconfidence b. 
 
In such a case the compulsory contribution formula must be uniform.
7 There are two uniform 
options, and its combinations. One is a flat compulsory contribution amount per employed 
person (Beveridge), and the other is a single contribution rate that applies to the full payroll 
(Bismarck). 
 
However, a Beveridgean flat contribution is free from evasion, and thus viable, only if the 
authorities can observe personnel movements and hours hired to each employee. If not, a flat 
contribution would allow employers to minimize contributions by underreporting the number of 
employees. Even when the planner observes the number of workers, but there is a minimum 
number of hours of work that must be met before a worker causes a compulsory contribution, 
employers can evade by underreporting the number of their employees that work hours above 
                                                 
7 There is no scope for a finite MTE, because lifetime personalized earnings ya are not observed by the authorities. - 9 - 
 
 
the threshold. It is precisely in the third-best informational setting where the planner is unlikely 
to have access to information about personnel movements and hours worked by each employee. 
If the set of employers free to underreport is large enough, the only feasible design is 
Bismarckian.
8 This immediately establishes the following: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: With third-best information, the only feasible MTE is indefinitely large, as in 
the Bismarckian design. 
 
The only remaining issue is how to determine the size of the Birmarckian contribution rate θ. In 
this scenario the planner may still use surveys, or other means, to determine the joint 
distribution of the unbiased old-age net earnings ratioψ in the population and the degree of 
overconfidence b, together with other personal preferences and circumstances information, 
which can be summarized in density h(ψ
e, b, s, β ,σ). 
A best “one size fits all” contribution rate takes into account that the planner is averse to the risk 
that insufficient compulsion cuts unbiased welfare. He is also averse to the risk that excessive 
compulsion reduces welfare, especially below laissez-faire levels, which is a possibility 
illustrated in section 4.2. The planner’s aversion to these outcomes is represented by a constant 
relative risk aversion function with parameter η ≥0. As the coefficient η rises, the planner cares 
more about the utility losses caused. Consequently, the planner should choose θ by maximizing: 
(3)  
[ ]
) 1 ( ) , (
) , , , , (
1
1 ) ( ) (
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4.2 Optimal compulsion for first-best information 
 
The “first-best” informational scenario is defined as one where the planner has access to very 
detailed information about each individual, that allows a very accurate estimate of the unbiased 
net earnings ratio when old for each individual (ψ). Specifically, in this scenario the planner 
knows preference parameters such as the utility discount factor β and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution σ, and knows the spread s on each individual’s consumer credit (and 
in a more general model, the return of private investment opportunities). The planner also 
observes active life earnings, ya. It will be shown that accurate estimation of the bias b is not 
important in the first-best scenario.  
 
4.2.a The first-best personalized contribution rate 
 
The benevolent planner solves P1 using his realistic, unbiased estimate for the individuals’s 
productivity ratio when old, ψ
p. The planner seeks to correct the bias by forcing the individual 
to save what her unbiased self would have liked. Nevertheless, he is aware that the individual 
can react to the mandate by reducing voluntary savings, which he cannot control.  
 
                                                 
8 This informational scenario also has implications for the benefit formula. If the authorities have administrative 
resources that at most allow observation of earnings in the last few years before the pension starts, then only a 
years-of-service formula based on the last few earnings is feasible, along with flat benefits. This informational 
setting is incompatible with an actuarial benefit formula based on lifetime contributions or lifetime earnings. - 10 - 
 
 
In this informational scenario, the planner’s decision can be modeled as in Valdés-Prieto 
(2002). The planner maximizes the individual’s unbiased welfare, W
u, subject to her budget 
constraint and to her response in terms of voluntary saving (the solution to P1). The planner 
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Note that lines (B) and (C2) use different assessments for the net productivity ratio when old. 
The planner’s unbiased ψ
e in (B) reflects the ability of the authority to exactly predict earnings 
when old. In contrast, (C2) uses the biased ratio ψ
e ( ≡ ψ
p + b)  because the individual chooses 
voluntary saving by relying on her own (biased) assessment of net productivity ratio when old. 
b is a ratio, hence may be called a “proportional” bias. Note that b is predicted with full 
accuracy in (P2). 
 
From (B) and (C2) and from F = F
biased  from (C) it follows that:  
 




p y b y c c ⋅ ≡ ⋅ − = − ψ ψ   Thus, if b > 0, then cp < cp
biased. 
  
This confirms that an overconfident individual plans to consume more when old than she will 
actually consume
9. The planner predicts this surprise and adjusts θ to help the improvident. 
Figure 1 describes the planner’s problem in the first-best scenario, by reporting the amount of 
voluntary saving chosen by an individual, as a function of the compulsory contribution rate θ. 
The figure is obtained with the parameter assumptions in the Appendix, for a specific value of 
the bias b of 0.20 (old age earnings is over predicted by 20% of active age earnings).  
Figure 1 shows that at low contribution rates, voluntary saving is substituted perfectly for 
mandatory saving. This is a standard result, because in this model, the link between 
contributions and benefits is the same in both types of saving. In this illustration, voluntary 
assets fall to zero when the contribution rate comes close to 16%. For higher contributions rates, 
total saving rises. For contribution rates above a number close to 36% in the illustration, total 
saving rises more slowly, because the individual chooses to leave the corner with F = 0 and 
takes some consumer 
 
Figure 1: Voluntary, Compulsory and Total Saving in response to θ, first-best 
                                                 
9 In a simple two-period life model, this negative income shock is perceived just at the end of her active phase. 





credit, which carries the obligation to pay the spread s. Since this spread reduces wealth, 
substitution between compulsory saving and consumer debt is imperfect. Although this 
simulation assumes that the spread s is merely 10% per annum (it is much larger in many 
emerging countries), it still creates a very wide range of contribution rates where voluntary 
saving is zero. In this illustration this range is about 20 percentage points wide. 
 
4.2.b How the bias affects the first-best amount of compulsion 
This subsection analyzes the hypothesis that the optimal amount of compulsion becomes 
smaller as the estimated bias b for the individual decreases (Gill et al 2005, Saint-Paul 2009).  
As shown by (P2), the planner needs to estimate each individual’s bias. Assume that the planner 
does observe a number of individual attributes, say because a personal identification number for 
workers allows employers to report personalized contributions and administration of 
personalized records is efficient enough. The planner may invest in surveys to estimate the 
relationship between each individual’s degree of overconfidence (the bias b) and her earnings ya 
and other attributes za such as age, gender, residence area, type of job, etc.. Through this method 
or others, the planner comes to learn the following relation that predicts each individual’s bias: 
 
(5)  . 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; ) , ( = > + = ε ε ε E Var z y B b a a        
where b is the actual bias and  B(ya,za) is the predicted bias for an individual with earnings ya 
and other attributes za.
10 The error term ε summarizes the impact of variation across individuals 
in (ψ
e , s, β, σ) within the subset that shares a common set of observable variables (ya,za), and 
Var(ε) measures one aspect of the planner’s ignorance. 
 
                                                 
10 Saint-Paul (2009) suggests that ∂Β/∂ya < 0. - 12 - 
 
 
The case of zero variance for ε is analyzed first. Figure 2 shows unbiased individual welfare for 
different levels of the actual and predicted bias (these coincide for Var(ε) = 0, as shown by (5)). 
For a zero bias (b = 0, Var(ε) = 0), the level of unbiased welfare is represented by the higher 
dashed lines. In this case compulsion is irrelevant as long as the contribution rate θ is below the 
voluntary saving rate in the absence of compulsion. In the case of zero bias, the first-best 
amount of compulsion is not unique, because there is perfect substitution between voluntary and 
compulsory saving in the fiscally neutral setting analyzed in this paper. In this case it is 
incorrect to assert that the only best policy is no compulsion (θ* = 0).
11 
 
For a positive bias (b > 0), and Var(ε) = 0, Figure 2 shows that a well-chosen compulsory rate 
raises unbiased welfare above the level attained in laissez-faire, which is the level attained when 
the compulsory contribution rate is zero. It also shows that when the compulsory contribution 
becomes large enough, the individual is forced to save “too much” in the sense that her 
unbiased welfare falls steeply. Since unbiased welfare can fall below the laissez-faire level, the 
range of contribution rates in which benevolent first-best social insurance is justified is finite.
12 
 
Figure 2: Unbiased Welfare versus contribution rate for different actual biases 
 
 
Three lessons follow from figure 2. First, compulsion does not improve unbiased welfare if the 
contribution rate is small enough, due to perfect substitution of compulsory for voluntary 
actions. Second, the size of the actual bias affects the size of the smallest contribution rate at 
which unbiased welfare can be improved by compulsion. This “smallest effective contribution 
rate” is inversely proportional to the actual degree of overconfidence b, because the size of 
actual b or ψ
e influences the individual’s decision. Third, for contribution rates above the 
                                                 
11 The same result obtains for cases with b < 0 (unjustified pessimism, leading to oversaving). Since compulsory 
saving is unable to help the individual, these cases are represented in Figure 2 by the line for b = 0. She chooses 
some point in the right-hand side of the curve. Her unbiased welfare falls as her degree of pessimism rises. 
12 For very large contribution rates, where the individual responds by issuing consumer debt, the negative wealth 
effect caused by the cost of spread s creates a kink in the curve in Figure 2, in the rightmost range. - 13 - 
 
 
“smallest effective contribution rate”, the size of the actual bias does not influence the 
individual’s decision (the amount of voluntary saving F*), because it is already at a corner, and 
thus is fixed (at zero in this model). 
 
Most important, optimal compulsion θ is independent from the size of the actual bias. Figure 2 
shows clearly that the size of the actual bias b does not affect the planner’s decision in this 
informational scenario. It follows that the predicted bias B, and thus (ya,za) are irrelevant for 
policy. The intuition is that the planner’s optimal compulsion is always equal to the voluntary 
saving rate in the absence of bias, regardless of the size of the actual bias. 
 
Of course, this result obtains only because the planner never errs in determining the individual’s 
optimal total saving in the absence of bias. This is what first-best information is about, i.e. 
planner knowledge of each individual’s true (ψ, s, β, σ).  
 
These results extend also to the general case with Var(ε) > 0. In this case the three cases shown 
in Figure 2 can be interpreted as consequences of three different values for ε. Since the optimal 
θ is the same for all values for ε, and the planner maximizes a weighted average of the unbiased 
individual welfares that result for each value for ε, it follows that the optimal θ is the same for 
any distribution of ε. One corollary is that the size of error ε,  and of Var(ε) are irrelevant for 
policy, i.e. for the optimal θ. Again, this result obtains because the planner does not err when 
determining the individual’s optimal total saving in the absence of bias. Summarizing, 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  
With first-best information regarding optimal actions, and in the absence of fiscal 
consequences, 
a) The hypothesis that the optimal amount of compulsion for an individual is smaller when her 
actual or predicted bias is smaller, is false. 
b) The optimal personalized contribution rate is independent from each individual’s bias, and 
errors in estimating these biases are irrelevant for policy. 
 
5.  Optimal compulsion for intermediate informational scenarios 
The “second-best” informational scenario is defined here by an intermediate degree of 
information asymmetry faced by the planner regarding his unbiased estimate of the bias-free 
saving rate, determined at least by the net earnings ratio when old for each individual (ψ). His 
informational resources do not allow him to know exactly the values of (ψ, s, β, σ) for each 
individual, To model this realistic case, define: 
 
(6)       . 0 ) ( ; 0 ) ( ; ) , ( = > + = δ δ δ ψ ψ E Var z y a a
p  
where ψ is the actual old-age net earnings ratio, ψ
p is the old-age net earnings ratio predicted by 
the planner using the information available and δ is the planner’s error in predicting the old-age 
net earnings ratio. 
Since the planner also predicts the bias b with error (recall equation (5)), the issue to be 
explored is how optimal policy varies in response to different values of the two types of planner 




5.1 The second-best contribution rate for Var(ε) = 0. 
 
In this informational scenario, the planner faces significant uncertainty about the value of the 
individual’s old-age net earnings ratio, but predicts her bias accurately. 
A positive error δ > 0 leads the planner to underpredict net earnings in old age (note that 
δ ψ ψ − =
p ), and in turn overpredict the voluntary savings F* desired by the individual for old 
age. Therefore, for δ > 0 the naive planner would impose a compulsory contribution rate θ that 
is above her optimum. Conversely, a negative error δ < 0 leads the planner to impose a 
contribution rate that is lower than optimal. 
Figure 3 illustrates the case where δ follows a bimodal distribution, with values 0.15 or -0.15 
with probability 0.5. The planner predicts a central value for ψ equal to 0.6, but knows the 
actual value could be either 0.75 or 0.45. Lighter lines show the case for low bias (b = 0.1), 
whereas the darker lines show higher bias (b = 0.3), with no planner mistakes in predicting the 
bias. The higher dashed lines represent the lifetime welfare the individual would face when the 
planner underpredicts ψ; similarly, the dash-dotted lines represent the individual lifetime 
welfare when the planner overpredicts ψ. The middle lines show expected welfare as seen by 
the planner. He simply averages the vertical values of welfare, for each value of θ. In the 
Bernoulli distribution depicted, expected welfare for low values of θ is simply welfare for the 
high value of the old-age earnings ratio multiplied by 0.5 plus a constant. This constant reflects 
the fact that in response to low contributions, the individual with low old-age earnings ratio 
raises her voluntary savings to achieve the same total amount of savings, and the same welfare, 
that would have prevailed under laissez-faire. 
When the bias b is known to be small, the mistakes made by the planner when predicting ψ 
have asymmetric impacts: an excessive contribution rate imposes higher expected costs than an 
insufficient one. An excessive contribution rate leads to oversaving, because given the costly 
spread s, the individual prefers not to adjust by issuing consumer debt. Thus, excessive 
compulsory contributions reduce welfare. On the other side, because the bias b is small, the 
amount of total saving is close to optimal. Therefore, it is best for the planner to err from below 
than from above, when setting the contribution rate for a low-bias individual. This is clear in 
figure 3, in the light lines corresponding to low bias. It can be seen that the planner would 
impose considerable damage by setting a high contribution rate (above 17.5% in the figure) if 
he had underpredicted ψ, whereas the individual would be little affected by a low contribution 
rate if the planner had overpredicted ψ. The highest expected welfare seen by the planner is 
reached at a relatively low contribution rate. Indeed, it is reached exactly at the same 
contribution rate that would have prevailed if the planner had known accurately the net earnings 
ratio in old age of the low-bias individual and had ignored the case of high net earnings ratio. 
 
Figure 3: Optimal policy based on low-bias individuals’ corrections to the planner's mistakes 




Now check the case where the bias b is large in Figure 3. Again, an excessive contribution rate 
leads to oversaving, because of the costly spread s. Also again, an insufficient contribution rate 
permits the individual to adjust total savings by adding voluntary saving. However, as 
individuals only add voluntary saving to make total savings coherent with their biased 
preferences, for highly biased individuals that have low age-earnings ratios, total savings 
remain well below optimal (in figure 3, the line for an age-earnings ratio of 0.45 and high bias 
finishes its flat portion at a contribution rate of only 17%). Therefore, the planner faces 
comparable costs from oversaving and undersaving, as shown by the expected welfare line for 
the low bias case. The optimizing planner reacts to this by choosing a relatively higher 
contribution rate (about 20.5% in figure 3) when the bias is high. 
Summarizing, for Var(ε) = 0 and Var(δ) > 0, a higher bias b leads the planner to raise the 
compulsory contribution rate θ. This is not because the planner thinks that a higher bias 
warrants more compulsion on a benevolent basis, as in Saint-Paul (2009). The argument is more 
nuanced: it is the planner’s response to the fact that a more biased individual is less able to 
cover up the planner’s mistakes when he errs in providing sufficient amount of compulsion. The 
result evaporates if the net earnings ratio for old age is known accurately (figure 2), showing 
that the targeting argument is wrong. 
Further analysis of figure 3 shows that for bimodal distributions of the age-earnings ratio in old 
age, the expected welfare for the planner has two local maxima for intermediate levels of the 
bias, indicating a non-convex region and a discrete jump in θ* in response to certain changes in 
the predicted bias. This implies that some first derivatives of this function may not exist.  
To check the argument, we simulated problem P3 presented in section 5.2 below, simplified to 
insure that Var(ε) = 0. In contrast to the Bernoulli distribution depicted in figure 3, we - 16 - 
 
 
generated 200 values for δ taken from a uniform distribution. We then created 200 identical 
individuals differing only in their assigned δ, and optimized θ for several known values for the 
bias b. To avoid results from being influenced by the particular sample of δ, we repeated this 
experiment 100 times for each value of bias b, and averaged the optimal θs 
13. An important 
result (not shown) is that expected welfare has a single local optimum for θ in this stochastic 
setting, for all values of b and Var(δ). This result suggests that unless the distribution of δ 
exhibits abrupt jumps, as for figure 3, non-convex regions do not exist and standard 
comparative statics can be applied. Table 2 presents the results of these simulations. 
 
Table No. 2 : Optimal compulsory contribution as function of a bias that is accurately predicted 
(Var(ε) = 0; The planner’s prediction about the old-age net earnings ratio is ψ
p = 0.60 and  
the error in this prediction is δ ~ U(–D,D) with variance is D
2/3) 
 
Optimal θ  Predicted bias B    
( =b, Var(ε) = 0)  Var(δ) = (0.1)
2/3  Var(δ) = (0.2)
2/3 
0.001 0.1800  0.1632 
0.05       0.1883  0.1707 
0.10 0.1967  0.1818 
0.15 0.1968  0.1933 
0.20 0.1968  0.1995 
0.25 0.1968  0.1995 
0.30 0.1968  0.1995 
0.40 0.1968  0.1995 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on P3 and parameters in the Appendix. 
Table 2 reveals that optimal compulsion indeed rises with the bias. This is because the planner 
takes advantage of the fact that the less biased individual does better in covering up his 
mistakes. Table 2 shows also that when the planner is more uncertain about his own knowledge 
about the optimal action, he chooses to start compulsion at a substantially smaller level.
14  
 
Sensitivity analysis (not shown) was performed for two other levels of the old-age net earnings 
ratio, ψ
p = 0.50 and ψ
p = 0.70. As expected, the whole schedule of optimal contribution rates 
rises for ψ
p = 0.50 and falls for ψ
p = 0.70. This shift occurs because a lower old-age net 
earnings ratio increases the optimal saving rate. Moreover, the size of this shift is substantial. 
For example, for a predicted bias of 0.20 and Var(δ) = (0.1)
2/3, an increase in ψ
p from 0.50 to 
0.60 and then to 0.70 cuts the optimal contribution rate from 0.2129 to 0.1968 and then to 
0.1806 for a total of 3.23 percentage points. However, the results for the impact of the bias b on 
the optimal compulsion are the same as in Table 2. Other simulations (not shown) find that 
these results are also insensitive to the degree inequality aversion (η). 
 
                                                 
13 For consistency, we used the same δ error matrix generated when computing optimal θ for other values of bias b. 
14 The sensitivity of optimal compulsion to increases in the bias varies. For small errors about the optimal action 
(for smaller Var(δ)), the sensitivity is initially large and falls rapidly. In contrast, for larger errors about the optimal 
action, this sensitivity rises initially and only falls after the bias surpasses 0.15 in this illustration. In all cases, the 
influence of the bias on the optimal contribution tapers off as the bias exceeds 0.30. This indicates that the 
asymmetry of the impact of a mistake by the planner becomes almost constant for large biases.  - 17 - 
 
 
5.2 The second-best contribution rate for Var(ε) > 0. 
 
In this most realistic among informational scenarios, the planner predicts with error both 
optimal actions and biases. This paper assumes that these errors are independent. 
The basic reasoning of section 5.1 applies here. Consider first the case where the level of the 
predicted bias B is small. Recall from section 5.1 that for low Var(ε) the planner’s mistakes 
have asymmetric impacts on the individual’s welfare, and the optimizing planner reacts to that 
asymmetry by reducing the contribution rate. However, as Var(ε) grows: 
i-. It is more likely that the actual bias is significantly larger than the predicted bias (a large 
positive ε applies). The highly biased individual fails to compensate an insufficient 
contribution rate with a higher amount of voluntary saving. Therefore, the cost for the planner 
of his prediction error regarding the old-age net earnings ratio becomes substantial if δ > 0, 
maybe as substantial as if δ < 0. There is a smaller asymmetry in expected welfare from 
raising compulsory θ than with Var(ε) = 0. 
ii-. It is also more likely that the actual bias is significantly smaller than the predicted bias (a 
large negative ε applies). Since the predicted bias B is small, a large negative ε implies that the 
individual may even suffer unjustified pessimism (b < 0), which leads to oversaving. 
However, compulsory saving is unable to help such individuals. In that case, the sign of the 
planner’s mistake in predicting her old-age net earnings ratio does not affect her welfare loss. 
Thus, there is no further cost for the planner’ Again, the asymmetry in welfare impact from 
raising compulsory θ is smaller than with Var(ε) = 0. 
Summing up, when the level of the predicted bias B is small, the degree of symmetry faced by 
the planner, in the costs of raising compulsory θ, rises as Var(ε) grows. Therefore he raises θ 
when Var(ε) grows. 
Now consider the case where the predicted bias B is large. Recall that in this case and for low 
Var(ε), the planner’s mistakes have symmetric impacts on the individual’s welfare, and the 
planner reacts to this symmetry by avoiding cuts to the contribution rate. As Var(ε) grows: 
i.- It is more likely that the actual bias is significantly larger than the predicted bias. Again, 
the highly biased individual fails to compensate the planner’s mistake. The asymmetry in 
welfare costs remains modest. 
ii.- It is also more likely that the actual bias is significantly smaller than the predicted bias. 
However, since the predicted bias B is now large, the large negative ε is still compatible with 
substantial unjustified optimism (b >0), and with undersaving. Compulsory saving does help 
this individual. However, she does not want to compensate undercompulsion by the planner. 
Thus, the asymmetry in welfare costs remains modest. 
Summing up, when the predicted bias B is large, the planner faces a degree of symmetry that is 
similar to the case where the bias is predicted accurately. In other words, the size of Var(ε) 
matters little when the predicted bias B is large.  - 18 - 
 
 
Putting all together, the optimizing planner reacts to a larger prediction error for the bias (higher 
Var(ε)) by reducing his response to the size of the predicted bias B. As Var(ε) grows, the 
contribution rate imposed on high earners should grow to be same as imposed on low earners. 
5.3 Analytical framework 
The discussion in sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be formalized with the following analytical 
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When the planner predicts the bias with no error, density e(ε) collapses into a single mass point 
and the problem faced in section 5.1 is recovered. When the planner predicts the true old-age 
earnings ratio accurately, density d(δ) collapses into a single mass point. If both errors 
disappear, the first-best informational scenario is recovered (section 4.2). In the other direction, 
when the planner and predicts neither the optimal action nor the bias, the third-best 
informational scenario is recovered (section 4.1). 
 
Table 3 uses simulations to solve P3 numerically, to determine how the optimal contribution 
rate changes with the level of the predicted bias B in scenarios where the bias error ε has 
positive variance, as opposed to the scenarios where its variance is zero, as in Table 2. 
Simulations are conducted the same way as in Table 2: for both δ and ε, we create 200 random 
values from a uniform distribution. Robustness of the optimal contribution rate to the prediction 
error for the optimal action Var(δ) is reported too.
 
 
Table No. 3 : Optimal compulsory contribution and the predicted bias, for positive Var(ε) 
(The two prediction errors made by the planner are assumed to distribute uniform and independently.  
For the bias, ε ~ U(–0.15,0.15) and for the true old-age earnings ratio, δ ~U(–D,D) with D = 0.1 and 0.2;  
The planner’s prediction about the old-age earnings ratio is ψ
p = 0.60) 
 
Optimal θ  Predicted bias B 
Var(ε)=(0.15)
2/3  Var(δ) = (0.1)
2/3  Var(δ) = (0.2)
2/3 
0.001 0.1927  0.1775 
0.05      0.1940  0.1828 
0.10 0.1948  0.1900 
0.15 0.1958  0.1945 - 19 - 
 
 
0.20 0.1965  0.1971 
0.25 0.1968  0.1987 
0.30 0.1968  0.1994 
0.40 0.1968  0.1995 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on parameters in Appendix. 
Table 3 reveals that in the presence of planner errors about the bias, optimal compulsion also 
rises with the predicted bias.
15 However, the level of optimal compulsion starts higher than in 
Table 2, where the bias was predicted with full accuracy. In this case the planner is uncertain of 
the degree of bias each individual faces, so he prefers to mandate a higher contribution rate in 
case the individual has a higher bias than predicted. This is so because the effect of a mistake on 
the optimal contribution rate is not symmetric, since it creates a larger cost for the more biased 
individual. Here, the optimal contribution rate is not centered on the median individual, but 
shifts to a more biased individual. Finally, the sensitivity of the optimal contribution rate to 
increases in the predicted bias first rises and then falls, as the predicted bias rises. This remains 
true for all values of the prediction error about the optimal action, Var(δ). Again, for large 
predicted biases, the errors in predicting the bias do not influence optimal compulsion.
16 
 
By comparing Tables 2 and 3, it can also be seen that for a given level of Var(δ), a higher 
Var(ε) raises the optimal contribution rate when the level of the predicted bias is low. This 
confirms the reasoning presented in section 5.2. Still, Table 3 reveals additional subtleties, such 
as the existence of a range of intermediate values for the predicted bias in which an increase in 
Var(ε) reduces slightly the optimal contribution rate. The results of section 5 are summarized as 
follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: In second-best informational scenarios where each individual’s bias and 
true old-age earnings ratio are predicted with error, and in the absence of fiscal consequences,  
a) The hypothesis that the optimal amount of compulsion is smaller for individuals for whom 
the planner predicts a smaller bias B is correct, if the precision in predicting each individual’s 
old-age earnings ratio is held constant. 
b) For low-predicted-bias individuals, the optimal amount of compulsion falls as the precision 
in predicting each individual’s old-age earnings ratio rises, holding each individual’s 
predicted bias constant. 
Proof: Simulations of P3, summarized in Tables 2 and 3 and sensitivity analyses.  
Proposition 3 says that for a planner with intermediate informational resources, the optimal 
contribution rate θ can depend on the predicted bias B. This is in contrast to optimal policy for 
planners with extreme informational resources. However, this dependence is significant only for 
large Var(δ) and low Var(ε). Otherwise, this dependence is slight or irrelevant for policy. 
Another lesson from the analytical framework is that optimal compulsion for an individual 
depends on the levels for that individual of the predictor variables used by the planner, denoted 
(ya, za). This dependence occurs through the prediction rules in equations (7) and (8). There can 
                                                 
15 Expected welfare also has a single local optimum for θ, for all values of b, Var(δ) and η considered. 
16 Sensitivity analysis for ψ
p = 0.50 and ψ
p = 0.70, preserve the qualitative results of Table 3. The results are also 
insensitive to inequality aversion (η). 
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be conflicting influences. For example, if in a given population higher earnings on average 
reduces old-age net earnings (say, through earlier retirement not compensated by higher salary) 
and also reduces the bias, optimal compulsion rises on the first count and falls on the second, 
with an ambiguous net result. This is the basis for next section’s results.  
 
 
6. An application: the optimal Maximum on Taxable Earnings 
As explained in the Introduction, an important standing issue in pension economics is whether 
the optimal contribution rate θ for each individual should be reduced if her level of current 
earnings surpasses a finite threshold. This threshold is the “maximum taxable earnings” or 
MTE. Specifically, is there a behavioural rationale for a finite MTE?  
6.1 Notation and evidence on a Maximum for Taxable Earnings 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the MTE in 60 countries. In all those countries, the 
contribution amount for active (young) workers is a two-bracket continuous linear rule: 























Where  χi is the marginal contribution rate in bracket i , ya is covered earnings and MTE is the 
Maximum Taxable Earnings. This is the earnings threshold above which the second marginal 
contribution rate applies. The evidence in Table 1 shows that only concave cases where χ1  > χ2 
are observed. Let us define as ω the proportion by which the marginal contribution rate is 
reduced when the threshold MTE is surpassed. Therefore χ2 ≡ (1-ω)
. χ1 with ω > 0. In most 
countries the marginal contribution is cut by 100% when the threshold MTE is surpassed, so 
ω = 1, χ2 = 0 and (7) collapses into  ( ) MTE y Min y C a a ; ) ( 1⋅ ≡ χ . 
The average contribution rate for any given individual is  a a y y C / ) ( ≡ θ , or equivalently 
 (8)  [] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ; 1 ) ( 1 ω ω χ θ − + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = MTE y Min y a a       
Equation (8) reveals that when covered earnings ya exceeds the MTE, θ falls as ya rises. Figure 
4 shows how the functional form in (8) spans both the Beveridgean and Bismarckian extremes 
when the MTE rises from the minimum salary to very high levels (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 46).  




6.2 Benevolent rationales for a MTE 
 
In general, the benevolent rationales for a MTE may be of the fiscal, market-structure or 
behavioral types. Since this paper sheds light on the latter alone, this subsection identifies 
circumstances under which the other rationales can be ruled out. 
 
Fiscal rationales for a finite MTE, including redistributive and efficiency aspects, are certainly a 
major driver of actual MTE policy in a number of countries (Whitman, 2009). First, recall that 
other branches of social insurance, such as health insurance and unemployment insurance, 
usually create the extra tax ta on covered earnings, because the marginal benefit from extra 
contributions is expected to be smaller than the marginal contribution in present value. Fiscal 
neutrality requires the revenue from ta to be independent from the contribution rate θ, and 
therefore from (χ1,MTE,ω). One requirement for this is that the amount of labor supplied to 
covered jobs is independent from ta, which requires labor supply to be inelastic to real wages. 
For simplicity, we assume that to be the case in this model. 
 
Second, the base for ta may be subject to its own separate MTE. This MTE’ may be shared with 
the MTE for old old-age contributions, or may be an independent threshold, in the extreme one 
for each other branch of social insurance. To avoid this fiscal interaction, it is assumed here that 
the MTE for other branches of social insurance is indefinitely large. Therefore, although ta is 
applied to ya in full, the tax revenue from ta is independent from the MTE for old-age pensions.  
 
Third, the base and rate of non-contributory subsidies for the old may be linked to the 
contribution rate θ. This assumption is inappropriate when the non-contributory benefit formula 
withdraws the benefit in response to larger contributory pensions. For this reason, this paper 
assumes implicitly that non-contributory benefits are either flat (universal) or not available. The 
second case is appropriate for populations with earnings above the average, which comes close 
to where the UK’s Commission suggests placing the MTE (between the 75
th and the 90
th 
percentiles of the earnings distribution). Of course, this assumption precludes application of this 
paper’s results to the lower end of the earnings distribution, where subsidies are significant. 
MTE1 = 
Min Salary 





Beveridgean  Intermediate 




Fourth, the degree of pay-as-you-go finance allows the MTE to create a further fiscal impact. 
For example, under pay-as-you-go an increase in the MTE creates a cash surplus in the short 
run, and also increases the buildup of the hidden pension debt during a long transition. This 
fiscal consequence could determine the desired level of the MTE, depending on the direction of 
desirable intergenerational redistribution. To put aside this fiscal rationale for choosing the 
MTE, it is assumed that the compulsory pensions system is fully funded.  
Fifth, consider τS, the tax rate on the returns earned by voluntary saving, relative to τPF, the tax 
rate on the returns on compulsory saving. If fiscal incentives for voluntary old-age saving are 
generous, so that τS is low relatively to τPF, a lower MTE would reduce perceived taxes. In the 
opposite case where τPF < τS, the after-tax return earned by the fully-funded compulsory 
pensions system exceeds the one earned by independent voluntary saving for old age. In this 
case reducing the MTE would limit access of high earners to favorable fiscal treatment. To 
prevent the MTE from having either fiscal consequence, it is assumed here that τPF = τS. 
 
Now consider “market structure” rationales for a MTE. These are important in countries where 
administration of compulsory funded pensions (full funding was assumed above for fiscal 
neutrality) can be separated across several organizations, under either public or private control. 
These few large and heavily regulated organizations make the critical asset-allocation decisions, 
while individual security selection can be delegated to atomistic subcontractors. However, scale 
economies and the social gains from minimizing marketing expenditures by these organizations 
make this a concentrated industry. In contrast, voluntary financial saving is usually managed by 
hundreds of medium-sized firms. Non-financial saving is managed by millions of decision-
makers. Thus, asset-allocation decisions are much more dispersed for voluntary saving.  
 
A higher MTE increases the relative size of mandatory versus voluntary saving. Thus, it also 
raises the concentration of financial power in these few large regulated organizations, possibly 
with both antitrust and macroprudential consequences. The size of the MTE also affects the 
distribution of power between politicians (the State) and a dispersed private sector.  
 
Finally, an increase in the MTE increases the base on which these organization levy 
administrative charges. If market and regulatory conditions allow these charges to exceed 
marginal costs substantially, and these organizations are for-profit firms, then an increase in the 
MTE creates additional profits for the owners of these firms, at the expense of participants. 
Even if there are no legal barriers to the entry of new such firms, scale economies and sunk 
costs limit entry and shelter profits. Moreover, these firms’ owners have an incentive to lobby 
for a higher MTE. The resulting MTE may be far above the one justified by the behavioral 
rationale. 
 
In this paper, the administrative cost of compulsory saving is assumed to be flat at zero and 
charges are also assumed to be set at zero (r(+) = rPF). Thus, these market-structure rationales 
are ruled out by the absence of scale economies in the management of compulsory savings. 
 
6.3   A behavioural rationale for a finite MTE 
Now consider a behavioral rationale for a MTE. The analytical framework in problem P3 
establishes a link between the optimal contribution rate θ and current taxable earnings ya, as can - 23 - 
 
 
be seen by inspection of P3.This link relies on two functions, ψ
p(ya,za) and B(ya,za). Recall that 
the first function connects the predicted net earnings ratio when old (ψ
p) – which is the 
determinant of the bias-free saving rate or optimal action which we focus on - with current 
earnings ya and other observables za such as gender, education, age, employment status, health, 
homeownership, industry, occupation (including self-employment), etc. The second function 
connects the predicted bias (B) with the same observables. 
Assume that a State’s informational resources allow it to observe several of the za. Assume also 
that at least one of the observed za has a non-zero impact on the predicted net earnings ratio 
when old or on the predicted bias (ψ
p
2k ≠ 0  or B2k ≠ 0 for at least one attribute k). Then, it is not 
optimal policy to set a triplet (ΜΤΕ, ω, χ1), because it is based on current earnings alone. The 
triplet ignores the other determinants za , so it has lower predictive ability than what is feasible 
at no extra cost. Under optimal policy, the individual’s contribution rate depends on all 
observable socio-demographic attributes that have an impact on the predicted net earnings ratio 
when old and on the predicted bias. This is not a mere theoretical possibility, at least in the case 
of the predicted bias B. Stango and Zinman (2009, Table IV) find that the size of “exponential 
growth bias” is strongly and significantly influenced by gender and education, after controlling 
for the impact of the current wage quintile.
17 
Of course, anti-discrimination jurisprudence or legislation is likely to preclude a State from 
conditioning the compulsory contribution rate for old age on some of the k attributes with 
impact, such as gender. However, conditioning on other attributes such as occupational sector is 
common, and conditioning on educational attainment may be less constrained if adequately 
supported. Thus, the concept of a MTE is almost surely suboptimal for a State with modern 
informational resources.  
This result has several policy implications. First, the Beveridgian and Bismarckian designs and 
all intermediate levels for the MTE are obsolete for a modern State. Second, further 
complexities appear, especially with educational attainment. For example, in societies 
undergoing long-run economic growth based on education, the link between educational 
attainment (one of the za) and the predicted bias B, on the one hand, and the optimal action as 
proxied by the predicted net earnings ratio when old (ψ
p), on the other, has different 
implications depending on the sign of these links. If more education increases the bias B, as 
occurs for the bias measured with Canadian data by Bhandari and Deaves (2006), and the 
predicted net earnings ratio when old (ψ
p) is not affected by education, then the MTE should 
rise over time as absolute educational levels rise. However, if more education reduces the bias, 
as for the bias measured by Stango and Zinman (2009), the MTE should fall over time. Similar 
options appear when taking into account the impact of education on the predicted net earnings 
ratio when old (ψ
p). 
An information-constrained State 
Now consider the case of a State whose informational resources are limited to observe current 
earnings ya alone, while all the za are unobservable. Although historical evidence shows that 
many societies condition the contribution rate on the occupational sector, this informational 
                                                 
17 Other controls such as employment status, health, homeownership, industry and occupation (including self-
employment) may also be significant, but the authors did not publish the coefficients for them. - 24 - 
 
 
situation may be realistic within an occupational sector.
18 The question is whether the optimal  
link between the contribution rate and current taxable earnings has a functional form that can be 
adjusted to be close enough to the one imposed by the MTE approach. Note that ya could be 
expressed by the individual’s percentile position in the earnings distribution.  
The answer is not obvious because equation (4) in section 6.1 shows that the MTE approach 
imposes a very specific functional form on this link. As summarized in section 6.1, the MTE 
approach simply applies a constant contribution rate ( 0 ) ( ' = a y θ ) to earners below the MTE, 
and a falling contribution rate for high earners, as depicted in Figure 4: 
(9)   0 ) / 1 ( ) ( '
2
1 < ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = ω χ θ a a y MTE y     for ya > MTE. 
 
How does the MTE approach or schedule compare with the optimal schedule? To answer, let us 
define the solution θ ˆ to problem P3 as a function of earnings ya  in this case as 
)) ( ), ( ( ˆ
a a
p y B y ψ θ θ ≡ . This implies that in differentiable regions: 
 
(10)  1 2 1 1 ) ( ' ˆ B y
p
a ⋅ + ⋅ ≡ θ ψ θ θ . 
 
Table 3 shows that the optimal θ rises when the predicted bias (B) rises, but does so 
asymptotically until a fixed value is reached. Thus, θ2 ≥ 0 and is closer to zero for high levels of 
the bias B. The sensitivity analysis for Table 3 also showed that the optimal contribution rate θ 
falls unambiguously when the predicted net earnings ratio when old (ψ
p) rises, so θ1 < 0. 
Assume also that B1 ≤ 0, as in the evidence by Stango and Zinman (2009), where the higher 
earnings quintile has a lower bias B but the bias remains flat as earnings changes across the 
other quintiles. This implies: 
(11)   ? ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( )} ( ' ˆ { 1 = − → ⋅ + → + ⋅ − =
p
a y sign ψ θ     
There is potential for a substantial difference between the signs in equations (11) and (9), where 
the latter follows from the MTE approach. Concretely, the optimal contribution rate may rise 
with taxable earnings, which is not allowed by the MTE approach. This increase can happen if 
high earnings are correlated with smaller net earnings when old (say, due to a wealth effect 
causing earlier retirement and lower earnings in the second phase of life). Combined with the 
fact that smaller net earnings in old age necessitate a higher saving rate, this yields a larger 
optimal compulsory contribution rate for high earners, ceteris paribus. In other words, ψ
p
1 < 0  
if the wealth effect of earnings on the retirement age dominates the substitution effect. Of 
course, this effect may or may not be compensated by the effect of higher earnings on the 
predicted bias B, compounded by the impact of the predicted bias on the optimal contribution 
rate. The point is that the overall sign is uncertain from general principles and depends on 
empirical detail. 
                                                 
18 Similar results obtain for a much more unusual case, where the State does observe some of the za but the only 
socio-demographic attribute that has an impact on the predicted net earnings ratio and the predicted bias is current 
earnings ya , so that (ψ
p
2k = 0  and B2k = 0 for all k attributes za. - 25 - 
 
 
The MTE approach also imposes a specific curvature on the link between the optimal 
contribution rate θ and earnings ya. Indeed, equation (4) implies that for ya < MTE,  
0 ) ( ' ' = a y θ , and that for ya > MTE: curvature is: 
(12)  0 ) ( 2 ) ( ' ' 1
3 > ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = MTE y y a a ω χ θ .  
In contrast, in the optimal schedule, curvature is set by:  
(13)  11 2
2
1 22 1 1 12 11 1
2
1 11 ) ( 2 ) ( ' ' ˆ B B B
p p p θ θ ψ θ ψ θ ψ θ θ + + + + ≡  
The sign of (13) is not fixed and may vary. Since optimal policy does not impose a specific 
curvature, constraint (12) on the curvature of the link between the contribution rate and earnings is 
not warranted in general by the theory presented in this paper, even for an informationally 
constrained State which can only measure current earnings ya at the individual level. The MTE 
approach is inefficient if the impact of earnings on the desired age-earnings ratio for old age is 
negative enough. 
Finally, consider a further subcase, where empirical evidence for the country shows that earnings 
has a negligible influence on the desired age-earnings ratio for old age. In this subcase ψ
p
1 ≈ 0  and 
ψ
p
11 ≈ 0 .  Equations (10) and (11) imply that the MTE approach offers the optimal sign in the range 
of earnings where ya > MTE.  In the other range of earnings, the evidence by Stango and Zinman 
(2009) shows that the bias remains flat as earnings changes across quintiles other than the highest, 
so B1 = 0 in that range. Therefore, according to (10) it is optimal to have   0 ) ( ' = a y θ  for ya < MTE, 
which is exactly what the MTE approach offers. This evidence suggests that the optimal threshold 
between the two regions is near the 80
th percentile in the earnings distribution.  
Regarding curvature, the result for this subcase is mixed. In the region where ya < MTE, B1 = 0 and 
B11 = 0, which implies that the optimal curvature according to (13) is  0 ' ' ˆ ≡ θ , which is the one 
offered by the MTE approach. However, in the region ya > MTE  the optimal curvature is 
11 2
2
1 22 ) ( ' ' ˆ B B θ θ θ + ≡ . We know that θ2 > 0, but the results of Table 3 suggest that the sign of θ22 
varies. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence on the sign of B11. Therefore, there is no 
presumption of optimality for the positive curvature offered by the MTE approach in (12). 
6.4   Some policy lessons 
The results in this section allow a brief evaluation of the recommendation by the UK Pensions 
Commission in 2004, which is to set the MTE at a percentile of the earnings distribution, between 
75
th to 90
th. Stango and Zinman’s empirical work (2009) found that, indeed, only the highest 
quintile of earners have detectably lower bias in U.S.A. data for 1983 (in their case, a lower 
exponential growth bias), apparently supporting the suggested position for the MTE. However, 
these authors also find that the size of the bias is strongly influenced by gender and education. 
Conditioning on the latter can survive antidiscrimination jurisprudence and legislation. Since the 
UK collects significant data sets, this State is significantly wealthier in information than the 
constrained situation that would be needed to justify a MTE. - 26 - 
 
 
The UK Pensions Commission also ignored the other function that controls the size of a MTE, 
which is the one that connects current earnings ya with the predicted net earnings ratio when old 
(ψ
p). This connection may cancel the effect of the link between earnings and the predicted bias. For 
example, if high earnings cause significantly earlier retirement on average, dominating the 
substitution effect, high earnings leads to smaller net earnings when old. This would imply that the 
optimal action and the optimal compulsory contribution rate rises with earnings, making the optimal 
ω negative and converting the threshold MTE into a Lower Earnings Limit. 
Only in the case of a State whose informational resources are limited to observe current earnings ya 
alone, while all the za are unobservable, and in the further subcase where earnings has a negligible 
influence on the desired age-earnings ratio for old age, the recommendation by the UK Pensions 
Commission would be correct: the MTE approach is close to optimal. The evidence for the U.S.A. 
suggests that the optimal MTE would be close to the 80
th percentile of the earnings distribution. 
 
The recommendation made by the Chilean 2006 Presidential Commission on Pension Reform, 
approved later by Chilean legislators in 2008, can be evaluated as well. That proposal modified 
the indexing of the MTE. As of 2006, the MTE level covered about 90% of earners at the full 
rate, but this proportion was falling secularly, because the MTE was indexed to the Consumer 
Price Index and real wages were growing. From 2009, this indexation was replaced by an 
adjustment in proportion to the change in average taxable earnings during the previous year. In 
practice, this reform redefined the MTE as a fixed multiple of mean earnings as of 2009.  
 
The authorities justified this reform on behavioral grounds, declaring that the change would 
“help high earners reach a pension in accordance with their earnings”.
19,20 However, this paper 
finds that the behavioral rationale favors a contribution rate conditional on all observables that 
are compatible with antidiscrimination jurisprudence or legislation. The Chilean State also 
collects significant data sets, so it is better endowed than the constrained situation needed to 
justify a MTE. A second problem is that the link between net earnings ratio in old age and the 
level of earnings was not taken into account by Chilean legislators. Third, no empirical 
evidence is available to support the requirement that the bias in the Chilean population begins to 
fall for earnings above the fixed multiple of average current earnings that set the MTE since 
2009. Since a fiscal rationale was not mentioned by the authorities either, lobbying by the 
private managers of pension firms may have played the main role in this policy change. 
 
 
7. Directions for future research 
 
This paper identifies optimal policy when using compulsion to deal with behavioral biases such 
as excessive optimism about net earnings in old age, under asymmetric information. The finding 
is that the optimal use of compulsion is governed by the type and precision of the information 
on individuals that is available to the planner, with regards to the optimal action and to the bias. 
In the standard case, more biased individuals should be subject to a higher level of the 
compulsory action. Although a MTE is close to optimal for a State with constrained 
                                                 
19 See p. 360-361 in the Official History of the Law, in http://www.bcn.cl/histley/lfs/hdl-20255/HL20255.pdf  
20 The “high earners” that deserved help were those closely below the 90
th percentile of the earnings distribution, 
and not above, because if not, the Presidential Commission would have also raised the level of the MTE in addition 
to changing its indexation. A contrary argument, not captured in this paper, is that allowing the MTE to fall further 
relative to average earnings would have attracted some self-employed to the jobs covered by compulsion. - 27 - 
 
 
informational resources and under some further assumptions, the paper shows how more 
advanced States can be more efficient. 
 
Parallel research by one of the authors suggests that this result is fragile to how compulsion 
becomes binding. If the individual has access to other voluntary actions which substitute 
imperfectly for the compulsory action, and can be less costly than consumer credit, at least for a 
range of values, the connection can be reversed. For example, Valdes-Prieto (2010) allows 
individuals to escape excessive compulsory saving by moving to uncovered jobs, and the result 
is that optimal policy may be to reduce the level of compulsion on more biased individuals.  
 
General equilibrium effects can also be important. Compulsory contributions can affect fiscal 
revenue even in the fiscally neutral environment specified in section 6.2, because of the 
following effect (Valdés-Prieto 2010): compulsion raises total savings, and this raises the 
revenue from capital income taxation. This allows a cut in other tax rates, raising welfare. 
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Appendix: Parameter assumptions for the numerical simulations 
The parameters used in the simulations presented in this paper are set as follows. First, consider 
the size of the optimistic bias given by the difference b ≡ (ψ
e- ψ), measured in percentage points 
of y
c. The limited empirical data on parameter b supplied by Puri and Robinson (2007) suggests 
that it differs widely across the population. This section follows Valdés-Prieto (2010), who 
simulates a range of values, with an average bias of 20 percentage points of y
c. The predicted 
net productivity when old is set at ψ
p = 0.60 also measured in percentage points of y
c. This same 
value is used whether the planner knows the actual value (predicts with no error), or whether he 
predicts with an error.  
The impact of ageing is captured by assuming that even when biased, expectations about net 
productivity when old always comply with ψ
e < 1 and ψ  < 1. This imposes a restriction on b: 0 
≤ b ≤ 1- ψ. From the numerical range used, it follows that 0 ≤ b ≤ 0.40. The qualitative results 
of the simulations are not sensitive to changes in the value of ψ. 
The parameters that underlie earnings are as follows: Individual earnings in the active phase are 
calculated as ) 1 ( a a l w y − ⋅ ≡ ; where w is the wage rate per hour per unit of effective labor fixed 
at 1; and  ) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 ( ε a l −  is cumulative hours supplied in the active phase by the individual. 
Actual individual earnings when old are defined analogously as ) 1 ( p p l w y − ⋅ ≡ ; where 
) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 ( ε p l −  is cumulative hours supplied when old. It is further assumed that la  and  lp are 
set institutionally, in the sense that individuals cannot choose l, and that leisure is not valued. - 30 - 
 
 
Factor prices are given for an individual. The assumed values are w = 1 and r = 3% per year 
(after inflation). Labor productivity in the covered sector is set at 10 units when active. Τhe 
spread in consumer credit is set at 10 percentage points per annum following data for the U.S.A. 
(Lu, 2008). This implies that r + s = (1+0.03+0.10)
30 −1 = 38.116  (3,812% per 30-year period).  
The tax implicit in contributions to other branches of social insurance, net of marginal benefits, 
is set at ta = 0.15. The tax rate on the return from voluntary saving is set at τS = 0.20. Thus, the 
after-tax return on voluntary saving is (1 + 0.03
.(1-0.20))
30-1 =  2.0370  or 103.70% per 30-year 
period. The internal rate of return paid by the compulsory and fully-funded pensions system to 
each generation depends on the tax treatment for pension funds, given by tax rate τPF. The paper 
assumes equal tax treatment of mandatory and voluntary saving, so ρ
c = r(1- τPF) = (1+0.03
.(1-
0.20))
30-1 =  2.0370  (204% per 30-year period). 
Regarding preferences, we follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, p. 27), although labor choices 
are ignored to simplify. Their equations are: 
(10a)    [] { } 1 )) / 1 1 /( 1 ( ) (
) / 1 1 ( − ⋅ − =
− σ σ a a c c u    σ ≠1 
(10b)   [] { } 1 )) / 1 1 /( 1 ( ) (
) / 1 1 ( − ⋅ − ⋅ =
− σ σ β p p c c v   σ ≠1 
where σ  and β  are taste parameters. Τhe intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption, σ ,  is set at the value suggested by Auerbach and Kotlikoff : σ  = 0.25. 1 is 
subtracted in the curly bracket to insure that utility is positive for all values of σ , provided that 
consumption is large enough. In turn, positive utility is needed for the social welfare functions 
to be operative for all values for the inequality aversion parameter η. 
Impatience is set at 1.5% per annum, from the same source. This implies a discount factor β 
equal to 1/(1+0.015)
30 = 0.64 per 30-year period.    
For these preferences, the optimal choices D*, ca*/cp* and F*/ca* do not depend on labor 
productivity, so individual results are homothetic.  - 31 - 
 
 
Table 1: MTEs in 60 contributory earnings-related compulsory pension plans 








Other Countries in 
Americas, Asia, 
Pacific, and Africa 
Annual MTE 
for old age/ 
GDP per capita 
Group 1: High MTE  Group 1: High MTE 
Belgium  No limit  Indonesia  No limit 
Denmark (SP)    No limit*  Iran  No limit 
Finland  No limit  Malaysia EPF    No limit* 
Norway  No limit  Nigeria  No limit 
Portugal  No limit  Peru    No limit* 
Romania    No limit*  Panama  No limit 
Czech Republic  34.572  Yemen  No limit 
Poland   32.182*  Colombia    9.365* 
Croatia    7.858*  Saudi Arabia  9.166 
Israel 5.504  Turkey  2006  3.322 
Greece  4.649  China (varies )       up to 3.00 
Italy 4.571  Mexico      2.887* 
Australia     4.222*  Vietnam  2.598 
Germany (West)  3.175  Costa Rica  2.496 
Group 2: MTE below the USA’s  Group 2: MTE below the USA’s 
United States  2.328  Uruguay    2.301* 
Japan 2.255  Brazil  2.153 
Austria 2.058  Chile      2.146* 
Bulgaria 1.998  Guatemala  2.058 
Spain 1.997  Morocco  1.886 
Korea, South    1.907  Argentina    1.779* 
France
a            1.557  Trinidad and Tobago  1.088 
Singapore CPF    1.329*  Philippines EPF    0.801* 
Canada 1.235  Egypt  0.708 
Ukraine 0.927  Thailand  0.539 
Hong-Kong, China    0.882*  India PF  0.533 
Taiwan, China  0.525  Pakistan  0.502 
   Kenya  0.495 
Group 3: Above the MTE, the marginal contribution rate is smaller but larger than zero:
b 
United Kingdom    2.510* (54%)  Ireland  1.936 (73%) 
Russia  2.263 (20%)  Sweden  1.733 (63%) 





* indicates a fully funded pension plan. 
Note a: In most countries the same MTE applies to both worker and employer contributions. The only 
exception is France, where this table uses the simple average of the MTEs because the difference is small. 
Note b: in all countries in Group 3 except Russia, the MTE for the employer is indefinitely large but the MTE 
for the worker is finite, which is the one reported here. The percentage in the parenthesis is the ratio between 
the marginal contribution rate above and below the threshold. In the Netherlands and Russia at least one 
additional threshold is present, at lower earnings. 
Source: SSA, Washington D.C., Social Security Programs Throughout the World 2008 edition for 
Europe, 2007 edition for the Americas, 2008 edition for Asia-Pacific and 2009 edition for Africa. See 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
 
  